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A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICTING
INTERESTS INVOLVED IN LAND DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
JOHN M. HYSON"

W HEN

IT WAS PROPOSED that I serve as "commentator" for
today's symposium, I -inquired - quite naturally, I thought as to what the role of the commentator would be. In response to my
inquiry, it was suggested that I should provide an "academic overview," drawing together the loose ends left by the preceding speakers.
I am afraid that, given the present state of the law with respect to
land use and environmental controls, there are too many loose ends
for one person to pull together. I shall attempt, however, to put some
of the issues mentioned in the preceding discussions -in a general
analytical context.
All of the speakers, in one way or another, have addressed the
conflict in social values which must be confronted in discussing the
topic of this symposium. Whenever there is a proposal made for residential development in a relatively undeveloped community, there is a
conflict between the two social values of providing an adequate amount
of housing and maintaining the existing environment. More specifically, a proposal for high-density residential development will often
reveal the existence of three competing interests: First, there is the
interest of the developer who, though he may claim to be primarily
motivated by the selfless goal of providing homes for the homeless,'
is at least equally concerned with the manner in which land use and
environmental controls affect the right of "private property" which
he defines as the right to use one's property in the most profitable
fashion. Second, there is the interest of those outside the community
wherein development is sought - Mr. Bowser's "Underclass" who wish to reach the promised land of the split-level and the
backyard barbecue but whose hopes are stymied by the high cost of
suburban housing, a cost which reflects, at least in part, the expense
to the developer of meeting environmental standards. Finally, there is
the interest of the community wherein the development is proposed an interest in preventing the kind of development which will threaten
the "environment." As far as the citizens of the community are cont Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.A., Boston College,
1963; M.A., University of North Carolina, 1964; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967.
1. The battle against exclusionary suburban zoning has produced its own strange
bedfellows - the real estate developer and the liberal champion of the lower class.
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cerned, any development which changes the existing character of the
community constitutes a threat to the environment.
These three conflicting interests are not reconciled under the
law. Indeed, the conflict is created and maintained by the United
States Constitution. On the one hand, the interests of landowners are
buttressed by the taking clause of the fifth amendment, prohibiting the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. 2
Over fifty years ago, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., stated that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."3 As one
might imagine, there have been literally thousands of cases in which
courts have had to consider how far was "too far." 4 A developer or
landowner may reasonably argue that an environmental control which
severely limits the use of his land amounts to a taking for public use
without just compensation. However, it has long been recognized
that the oft-stated right of a private property owner to use his land
as he sees fit is a myth. First, the law of nuisance prohibits a landowner from using his land in such a way as to cause injury to the
land of another. Moreover, -the states have an inherent power - the
police power - to enact laws for the public health, safety and welfare.
Just as the law of nuisance prohibits a property owner from using his
land to the detriment of another's land, so a state can, through the
exercise of its police power, prohibit a property owner from using his
land in such a way as to injure the public. Thus, the taking clause and
the state's inherent police power provide the constitutional foundation
for the conflict between the individual developer's interest and the
interest of the community wherein development is proposed.
The second conflict is the conflict between the interests of residents of the municipality in which the development is sought and the
interests of non-residents who wish to become residents of the community. As I have already mentioned, it is the state's inherent police
power which provides the authority to regulate the use of land in order
to prevent injury to the public health, safety, or welfare. The states
have partially delegated this power by enacting legislation conferring
upon the municipalities the power to control the use of land through
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the Supreme Court originally held, in
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84 (1857), that the taking clause was applicable only
to the federal government and not the states, the Court later held that the taking
clause was incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
was thus binding upon the states. See Chicago, B.&Q. Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.

226 (1897).
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
4. The most prominent of these cases are collected and analyzed in F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss5/5
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zoning, sub-division ordinances, and other land use controls." State
laws conferring such powers upon municipalities inevitably provide
that the delegated powers are to be exercised for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.'
It was once generally assumed that a municipality's land use controls were valid if they promoted the health, safety, morals or welfare
of the enacting municipality. In other words, "general welfare of the
community" meant the welfare of the municipality exercising control
over land use. However, within the past fifteen to twenty years, some
courts, most notably the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,7 have ruled
that a municipality may validly enact and enforce land use controls
only if such controls promote the general welfare of the regional coinmunity.s Specifically, a suburban municipality may not control the
use of land and promote its own welfare while ignoring the welfare
of the region. Thus, for example, 4-acre9 and 2-acre ° minimum lot
size requirements have been struck down because, though they arguably may have promoted the welfare of the respective municipalities
by maintaining an open environment, they were detrimental to the
regional welfare because they restricted high-density, low-cost housing development.
I wish to discuss briefly, within the legal framework I have developed, an issue that has been discussed by other speakers - the
problem of sewer bans or moratoria. This issue is particularly appropriate for discussion at this symposium because sewer moratoria not
only have a significant effect upon land use decisions, but also are
justified on environmental grounds. The importance of sewerage and
sewage treatment facilities in land use decisions can scarcely be exaggerated. The absence of such facilities will effectively preclude highdensity development; their installation or expansion will attract highdensity development. But sewage treatment facilities have a finite
capacity and allowing that capacity to be exceeded leads to degradation
of the environment.
5. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Supp. 1974).
6. See, e.g., id. § 10105.
7. See Concord Township Appeal [better known as Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,
Inc.], 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) ; Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970) ; National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,

215 A.2d 597 (1965).
8. This requirement is outlined most succinctly in National Land & Inv. Co.,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), where the court stated: "the general welfare is not
fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and exclusionary."
Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
9. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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The relationship of sewage treatment facilities to land use and
the environment has led many communities to impose sewer moratoria in order to prevent existing treatment systems from becoming
overloaded. They accept, with no apparent remorse, the fact that
these moratoria effectively stifle further development. Since there
have been relatively few court decisions," the legality of these mora12
toria is quite uncertain.
Let us begin by examining the effect of a moratorium on the
property owner. The moratorium prevents the owner's use of existing sewage treatment facilities. There may also be a local ordinance
which prohibits the use of on-site septic systems or, perhaps more
likely, permits the use of such systems only upon lots of a specified
(and economically unfeasible) minimum acreage. The combination of
these restrictions precludes any kind of residential development. Moreover, even though the restrictions may prevent the profitable use of
the land, the owner may still be burdened with substantial taxes and
mortgage payments. Under these circumstances, it is hardly specious
for the owner to contend that the sewer moratorium is a regulation
which has, in the words of Justice Holmes, 1 gone "too far" and thus
constitutes a taking.
On the other hand, the municipality imposing the sewer moratorium may quite reasonably contend that the moratorium is a valid
exercise of its police power because to allow the overloading of the
existing sewerage and sewage treatment facilities would be harmful
to the public welfare. The public harm in such a situation is obvious,
but what if a municipality, after recognizing that its existing sewerage
and sewage treatment facilities were being used to capacity, were to
take no action to increase the capacity? After all, as far as the municipality is concerned, maintaining the status quo with a freeze upon any
further development may be quite acceptable. Such a situation, however, is totally unacceptable to those who are seeking to become
residents of the municipality. What can be done with such a municipality, which, by refusing to expand its sewerage and sewage treatment
facilities, fails to take into account the housing needs of non-residents?
11. The few relevant cases are discussed in Note, Control of the Timing and
Location of Government Utility Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REv. 945 (1974).
12. In the Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning decisions, supra note 7, the municipalities contended that the zoning was justified because of the expense involved in
providing public facilities and services for a rapidly expanding population. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has consistently rejected this argument. In
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 395 (1970), the court stated: "Municipal services
must be provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence [the municipality] is a logical
place for development to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will not
bear its rightful part of the burden." 437 Pa. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (emphasis
in original, footnote omitted).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss5/5
13. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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Is the community under any legal obligation to provide such facilities
in order to accommodate continued growth? After all, this situation
is different from that in which a municipality has used its zoning
power to restrict development. In the latter situation, a municipality
has taken an affirmative step to prevent development. However, where
a municipality fails to expand existing sewage treatment facilities, it
is simply declining -to take an affirmative step - the expenditure of
public funds - to accommodate development. Even if a municipality
does expand its existing sewage treatment facilities to accommodate
development, questions remain about whether it can impose the cost
of that expansion upon the new developers (and thus, indirectly, upon
the new residents), or whether the cost of the expansion must be
borne by both the existing and new residents of the municipality. These
14
are difficult questions to which the courts have given few answers.
Equally difficult legal questions arise when a community has
sewerage and sewage treatment facilities with capacities in excess of
the community's present needs. For purposes of illustration, permit
me to make reference to a controversy that exists in this immediate
area. It revolves around the construction of a new sewage treatment
facility, the Valley Forge Area Wastewater Treatment Facility, designed to serve the communities -in Chester County. The Environmental Protection Agency, acting through Dan Snyder, the Regional
Administrator, has approved federal funding for the facility but, before
releasing federal funds, has quite reasonably required that the facility
be designed to meet not only the present requirements of Chester
County, but its future needs as well. It has been estimated (and the
estimates vary depending upon who is doing the estimating) that the
proposed facility would have the capacity to service up to six times
the present population of Chester County. If the proposed facility is
constructed, it seems reasonable to assume that the municipalities in
Chester County will be subjected to enormous developmental pressures.
The issue, then, is whether they must succumb to these pressures and
have the rural countryside transformed almost overnight into another
heavily populated suburban county. Those who suggest that the Chester County communities can use zoning to hold back such development
may be underestimating the limitations put upon that power by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's National Land, Kit-Mar, and Girsh
decisions."5
Perhaps the answer in Chester County is sophisticated, good
faith, comprehensive planning. By this I mean planning that is not
14. For a general treatment of these difficult problems, see Note, supra note 11.
498 (1972).
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only designed to accommodate the legitimate conservation desires of
Chester County's present inhabitants, but also attempts to help resolve
the pressing housing needs of the Philadelphia regional population."6
This type of planning appears to have been the basis for the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Planning Board of
Town of Ramapo.17 Ramapo is a suburban New York City community which had undergone extremely rapid growth. This growth
had imposed a heavy financial burden upon the town because of the
cost of providing the public facilities (sewerage, schools, etc.) necessary to service the expanding population. In addition, the growth
was taking place in a rather haphazard fashion, and the town was
forced to provide facilities at times and in places inconsistent with a
logical growth scheme. The town reacted by undertaking an extensive
four-volume study of the community. This study provided the basis
for a master plan, a comprehensive zoning ordinance, and a capital
improvements program. All of these documents were designed to
ensure that future development would take place in a phased, orderly
manner. The key to the zoning ordinance was a provision requiring
the issuance of a permit as a condition precedent to residential development. Permits would issue only if the land proposed for development
were situated in close proximity to existing public facilities.' 8 The
ordinance's permit provision was complemented by a capital improvement program committing the town to providing adequate public facilities for the entire community over the course of an 18-year period.
A developer, who had been denied a permit, challenged the validity
of the ordinance. Among other things, the developer contended that
the ordinance was designed as an exclusionary device and was an invalid exercise of the police power. The court expressed its general
agreement with the landmark decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,'" stating that it would not countenance "community efforts at
immunization or exclusion." 2 Nevertheless, the court upheld the
Ramapo ordinance upon the following rationale:
[F]ar from being exclusionary, the present amendments merely
seek by the implementation of sequential development and timed
growth, to provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated to
16. These needs are documented in the Regional Housing Allocation Plan (1973)
prepared by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (copy on file at the
Villanova Law Review).
17. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
18. If a developer did not wish to wait for the community to provide the necessary
public facilities, he could provide them himself and thereby become entitled to a
development permit. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296.
19. See note 7 supra.
20. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss5/5
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the efficient utilization of land. The restrictions conform to the
community's considered land use policies as expressed in its comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maximize
population density consistent with orderly growth. 2 '
The key to the Ramapo decision was the court's finding that
Ramapo's sequential development and timed growth scheme constituted a bona fide attempt to accommodate population growth. Communities attempting to make use of a Ramapo-type program should
not lose sight of the factors which allowed the court to find that the
Town of Ramapo was acting in good faith. An essential part of the
Ramapo scheme was a credible commitment to a capital improvement

program which, when completed, would accommodate development
throughout the community. Perhaps the most convincing indication
of the town's good faith was its "provisions for low and moderate
income housing on a large scale." 2
The lesson of Ramapo seems to be that a community may validly
protect its "environment" through a timed-growth program. The
price for a valid program to protect the environment is the accommodation of the competing social interest in providing adequate housing.
Ramapo met this obligation with its long-range commitment to pro-

vide public facilities and its ample provision for low and moderate
income housing. It remains to be seen how many other suburban communities are willing to pay this price.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303.
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